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SUMMARY 
 
 
Following the proposals for nuclear fuel assurance of International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) Director General Mohamed ElBaradei, former Russian President Vladimir V. 
Putin, and U.S. President George W. Bush, joint committees of the Russian Academy of 
Sciences (RAS) and the U.S. National Academies (NAS) were formed to address these and other 
fuel assurance concepts and their links to nonproliferation goals.  The joint committees also 
addressed many technology issues relating to the fuel assurance concepts.  This report provides 
background information and support for the following consensus findings and recommendations 
of the joint committees: 
 
Finding 1a 
By 2020, many countries that currently do not have a nuclear power plant are likely to initiate 
national programs for the construction of nuclear power stations.1  These countries do not now 
have facilities for uranium enrichment for nuclear fuel production or spent nuclear fuel 
reprocessing. 
 
Finding 1b 
Uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing are the key technologies that enable countries to 
produce direct-use materials for nuclear weapons.2  The more countries to which either 
technology (enrichment or reprocessing) spreads, the greater the proliferation risks.  Currently it 
appears that more countries that have not already deployed these technologies are interested in 
establishing uranium enrichment programs than in pursuing spent fuel reprocessing technologies, 
making the spread of enrichment technology a greater near-term concern for nuclear 
proliferation.  But the intention to acquire spent nuclear fuel reprocessing capabilities was the 
main focus of proliferation concerns in the 1970s and could become so again.  
 
Finding 1c 
Requirements of the nuclear security environment, the difficulty of providing safeguards and 
security, and the demand for nuclear fuel cycle services change over time, and technology 
advances with time.  Any approach for enhancing the nonproliferation features of international 
fuel cycles must be staged to respond to the nonproliferation needs of the time period.  Today 
this suggests a focus on convincing countries that they do not need to establish their own 
enrichment facilities, which has motivated efforts by several countries and international 
organizations to address the enrichment issue.  Similar efforts are needed to convince countries 
that they do not need their own reprocessing facilities.  Also needed are strengthened efforts to 
prevent the spread of these technologies through illicit or inadequately regulated exports and 
black-market nuclear networks, and improved safeguards for both uranium enrichment and spent 
                                                 
1 Until and unless construction begins, estimates of nuclear growth are based upon expressions of interest and should 
be considered as having substantial uncertainty. 
2 The main nuclear weapons materials are highly enriched uranium, obtained by enriching naturally occurring 
uranium, and plutonium, primarily obtained by reprocessing irradiated reactor fuel. 
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fuel reprocessing facilities, designed both to increase international confidence that significant 
diversions from declared facilities would be detected and to strengthen the ability to provide 
timely warning concerning covert facilities and activities.  
 
Recommendation 1a 
The countries that currently provide nuclear fuel services should redouble efforts, with other 
countries and the IAEA, to establish mechanisms for increasing reliability of supply of nuclear 
fuel, so that countries that do not now have enrichment technology would have reduced 
incentives to build their own uranium enrichment facilities.  
 
Recommendation 1b 
The international community should help countries provide adequate capacity for safely storing 
spent fuel (on their own territory or elsewhere), or reliable reprocessing services from existing 
providers, to reduce countries’ incentives to establish their own reprocessing facilities.  
Separated plutonium or fabricated plutonium fuel should not be sent to countries that have not 
previously received such material and do not have reprocessing capabilities.  The spread of 
separated plutonium to additional countries poses many of the same proliferation risks posed by 
the spread of reprocessing capabilities.  
 
Recommendation 1c 
For similar reasons the United States and other nations should reduce and seek to minimize 
commerce in and the transfer of highly enriched uranium (which poses proliferation risks) except 
if sealed in a reactor core.  
  
Second-level findings: 
 
a. To ensure a reliable supply of nuclear fuel, a country needs reliable fuel fabrication 
services as much as it needs reliable sources of uranium and enrichment services.  
b. To assist in the international fuel assurance programs, it would be helpful if nations 
with fuel fabrication facilities made those available. 
c. Fuel fabrication technology for uranium oxide fuel with low-enriched uranium is not 
sensitive from a proliferation perspective.  Hence, if countries choose to establish 
their own fabrication capabilities to produce fuel assemblies for their own nuclear 
power stations, without establishing uranium enrichment or spent fuel reprocessing 
capabilities―as South Korea has done, for example―this should not pose significant 
international concerns. 
  
Finding 2 
Several messages are clear from the NAS-RAS workshop and other recent discussions in Vienna 
about assurance of supply: 
 
a. Few countries have declared a willingness to forgo forever a right to develop their 
own uranium enrichment or spent fuel reprocessing nuclear technology in the future.3  
                                                 
3 The charter of the International Uranium Enrichment Center in Angarsk, Russia, requires members other than the 
host country to commit to not develop their own uranium enrichment capabilities.  As of June 2008, Kazakhstan and 
Armenia have made that commitment and become members. 
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Some countries have expressed adamant opposition to requiring a country to forgo the 
development of its own enrichment and reprocessing technologies as a condition of 
assurance of supply of nuclear fuel or low-enriched uranium.   
b. To be successful, uranium enrichment, fuel assembly production for nuclear power 
stations, and spent fuel storage/reprocessing technologies continue to operate in the 
international market.   
c. No single mechanism or strategy for assurance of nuclear fuel supply is likely to 
address every country’s legitimate needs and desires.  Each country’s or region’s 
needs and requirements may be different. 
d. New mechanisms for assured nuclear fuel supply may only modestly change 
countries’ incentives to establish enrichment facilities, as the existing international 
market provides strong assurance of supply, and countries have a variety of other 
reasons for establishing their own enrichment plants, including a desire to participate 
in the profits of enrichment, national pride, and a desire to establish a nuclear 
weapons option for the future. 
 
Recommendation 2a 
The governments of the United States and Russia should continue to support a broad menu of 
approaches to increasing assurance of nuclear fuel supply.  
 
An array of mechanisms for assurance of nuclear fuel supply has been proposed, from 
diversified long-term contracts through the existing market, enrichment bonds,4 and 
international fuel centers to creating a virtual or actual fuel bank.  Some of these are 
already in place.  The Russian and U.S. governments should support a broad menu of 
these approaches, ensuring that these do not undermine each other.  
 
Recommendation 2b 
The governments of the United States and Russia should seek to establish additional benefits and 
incentives for countries that choose not to establish their own uranium enrichment and spent fuel 
reprocessing facilities.  Possibilities could include assistance in establishing the necessary 
infrastructure for safe and secure use of nuclear energy.   
  
Recommendation 2c 
To support nonproliferation goals, the nations that currently supply nuclear fuel should work 
expeditiously with other countries and the IAEA to make assured fuel supplies available before 
there is a major commitment to new nuclear power plants by countries that do not have them 
today.   
 
Finding 3a 
It is feasible to establish a multinational center to provide enrichment services without sharing 
enrichment technology for countries willing to refrain from developing their own enrichment 
                                                 
4 Enrichment bonds: A guarantee by a state that supplies enrichment services that enrichment providers will not be 
prevented from supplying the recipient state with uranium enrichment services if the guarantee is invoked (adapted 
from a proposal by the United Kingdom). 
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facility as long as they participate in the center.5  The International Uranium Enrichment Center 
(IUEC) in Angarsk, Russia, is one such center.  There have been proposals to establish centers 
under international organizations, although their feasibility has yet to be established.  An 
international dialog, in which concerned countries evaluate the pros and cons of supplementing 
multinational centers with a center under international control, is needed.  Two European 
multinational consortia have provided enrichment services for two decades: Eurodif, like the 
IUEC, does not share its technology among its members, but participants need not forgo 
development of enrichment technology as a condition of participation.  Urenco has only three 
partners, all of which have access to its technology.  
 
Finding 3b 
If global usage of nuclear energy increases, it may become increasingly difficult to maintain a 
system in which nationally controlled facilities in only a few countries provide all enrichment 
and reprocessing services, as desirable as that might be from a nonproliferation perspective.  
Offering the opportunity to profit from these technologies may reduce the likelihood that 
countries would perceive efforts to inhibit expansion of access to the technology as unfair. 
  
Recommendation 3  
Over time, Russia, the United States, and other nations should work to create a global system 
featuring a small number of centers for the sensitive steps of the fuel cycle (especially 
enrichment and spent fuel management, possibly including storage, reprocessing, or disposal), 
owned, operated, and controlled by consortia of states or international organizations (but without 
spreading the relevant technologies beyond existing technology holders).  Such a global system, 
offering many countries the opportunity to participate and share in the profits, would provide a 
somewhat more equitable and sustainable long-term basis for limiting enrichment and 
reprocessing facilities to a small number of countries.  There has been some criticism that the 
proposed mechanisms are unfair.  The preliminary arrangements should be improved over time. 
 
Finding 4 
As use of nuclear power grows, there is a need worldwide for well-educated personnel to support 
the whole nuclear fuel cycle. 
 
Recommendation 4 
Countries with large nuclear power programs, such as the United States and Russia, should 
encourage young people to enter nuclear engineering and related fields and programs that give 
the breadth of perspective needed. 
 
Finding 5 
Arrangements that would provide assured return of spent nuclear fuel could provide a much 
more powerful incentive for countries to rely on international nuclear fuel supply than would 
assured supply of fresh fuel, because assured take-back could mean that countries would not 
need to incur the cost and uncertainty of trying to establish their own repositories for spent 
                                                 
5 By a multinational center, the joint committees mean a facility whose ownership and management involves an 
arrangement among several countries.  Eurodif, Urenco, and the International Uranium Enrichment Center at 
Angarsk are examples.  By an international facility, the joint committees mean a facility whose ownership and 
management are centered in a fully international organization such as the IAEA. 
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nuclear fuel or nuclear waste.  Further, it would reduce the number of countries where 
plutonium-bearing material is stored around the world.  Fuel leasing, reactor leasing, and similar 
approaches could have this benefit, if managed appropriately.  For many countries, however, the 
political barriers to taking back other countries’ spent nuclear fuel or nuclear waste are 
substantial.  
 
Recommendation 5 
The United States, Russia, and other suppliers should increase their emphasis on establishing 
mechanisms for assured fuel-leasing or reactor-leasing services,6 including take-back of all 
irradiated fuel.  Russia already has legislation and arrangements in place to offer fuel leasing and 
has such a contract in place with Iran.  In both international fuel supply approaches and in take-
back of spent fuel, Russia is farther along in offering services to other countries.  The United 
States and Russia should work together on cooperative approaches that would make it possible to 
enter into fuel-leasing arrangements in which they would guarantee to supply, and to take back, 
fuel for the lifetime of reactors built in “newcomer” states, with the fuel taken back to Russia for 
now, or to the United States, as well, if circumstances someday make that possible.   
 
Finding 6 
A hidden danger of creating such centers is the potential for leakage of sensitive technology.  
The most damaging leakage of sensitive technology occurred when A. Q. Khan, working as a 
contractor for Urenco, was able to acquire enough information and contacts to build the supply 
line for Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program.  Khan went on to form a supply network that fed 
into weapons programs in Libya, North Korea, and Iran. An event like this puts the 
nonproliferation regime in great danger.  
 
Recommendation 6a 
The United States and Russia should work diligently with other nations to ensure that all efforts 
to establish international centers for enrichment, reprocessing, or other sensitive activities 
include specific, stringent plans to prevent leakage of sensitive information and technology.  
Plants with staff from countries that do not have technology of the type used at that plant should 
maintain the sensitive technology in “black boxes” so that the international staff does not have 
access to the technologies themselves.  Plans to prevent technology leakage should be subject to 
review by a small group of international experts familiar with such technology controls before 
the centers are established. 
 
Recommendation 6b 
Russia the United States and other countries working to develop centers should have criteria for 
participation.  Two major criteria for participation by countries beyond the technology holders 
who provide the technology for the center should be that they not have or be developing an 
enrichment facility, and that they should be in compliance with IAEA safeguards and 
nonproliferation obligations. 
                                                 
6 Today the only discussions of reactor leasing are those on the floating power plants being built by Russia and the 
nuclear battery being proposed by Toshiba.  There will be many legal issues to work out in both cases. 
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Finding 7 
Safeguard arrangements, fuel transfer processes, and return of spent fuel provisions are only a 
few of the complex legal issues that must be resolved if fuel assurance, fuel take-back, and 
multinational or international fuel center programs are to be effective. 
 
Recommendation 7 
The IAEA should lead an international effort to identify these legal questions and options to be 
considered.  The IAEA should also convene countries to reach agreement on preferred solutions. 
 
Finding 8 
Both Russia and the United States are working on new technologies for processing spent fuel, 
intended to reduce the economic costs and proliferation risks of traditional reprocessing 
approaches and improve waste management.  The technologies being proposed would still pose 
significant proliferation concerns if deployed in countries that did not previously have 
reprocessing capabilities.  The new technologies under development will take significant time 
before being ready for demonstration at commercial scale.   
 
Recommendation 8 
Developers of nuclear fuel cycle technologies should assess the technologies’ proliferation risks 
and projected economic costs and benefits as critical elements of design. 
 
Finding 9a 
In most cases, reprocessing is not economic under current conditions.  When the world’s 
economically recoverable uranium resources diminish compared to demand or there is 
widespread deployment of fast reactors, then reprocessing may become economically attractive. 
 
Finding 9b 
Excess stocks of plutonium separated from spent fuel, beyond plutonium that would be needed 
for making MOX fuel for use in the near term, pose security risks.  
 
Recommendation 9 
States should end the accumulation of stockpiles of plutonium separated from spent fuel as soon 
as practicable, and begin to reduce existing stocks.  Spent fuel should only be reprocessed when 
its constituents are needed for fuel, or when reprocessing is necessary for safety reasons. 
 
Finding 10 
Many of the technologies for improved nuclear fuel cycles are not areas that will advance 
without directed research specifically focused on the nuclear fuel cycle; advances in other areas 
of science and engineering will help, but are not sufficiently linked to nuclear fuel cycles to solve 
the technical challenges described here, by themselves.  Research is needed in the areas of 
processing of irradiated nuclear fuel and nuclear fuel design (beyond the incremental 
improvements in uranium oxide fuel for light water reactors), as well as in improved approaches 
to disposal of wastes or spent fuel, and reduced-cost recovery of uranium from low-grade 
sources.  Additional research and development is also needed to develop advanced safeguards 
and security technologies that can provide increased capabilities to detect covert nuclear 
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facilities; highly accurate near-real-time monitoring of material flows in bulk processing plants 
with reduced intrusiveness, increasing confidence that any diversion would be detected; low-cost 
real-time monitoring that would set off an immediate alarm if stored nuclear material were 
tampered with or removed; effective protection against sophisticated outsider and insider theft 
and sabotage threats at reduced cost; and design of facilities to simplify and increase the 
effectiveness of safeguards. 
 
Recommendation 10 
The U.S., Russian, and other governments should take the lead in a cooperative international 
effort to make additional research and development investment in advanced safeguards and 
security technologies.  A focused effort should be made to make the results of this research and 
development available to the international community to ensure that new facilities are more 
secure and readily safeguarded.  The international community also should adopt the philosophy 
of designing high levels of security and safeguards into new nuclear systems and facilities from 
the outset, including both the inherent technical characteristics of the process and the institutional 
measures to be taken. 
 
Finding 11 
It is not possible today to construct an entire, operational international fuel cycle program.7  Such 
a program will have to be built incrementally.  However, elements of that program currently 
exist and the groundwork for other elements has been laid. 
 
Recommendation 11 
The U.S., Russian, and other governments should 
• continue to invest in research and development on advanced approaches to once-
through and closed fuel cycles that offer the potential to improve proliferation 
resistance, safety, security, economics, resource utilization, and waste management 
• utilize a systems approach to developing and assessing these technologies, with clear 
objectives and technically justifiable criteria for decision making.  Use systems 
analysis to identify potentially promising approaches before proceeding to build pilot 
or larger facilities. 
• take all relevant proliferation risks into account when assessing proliferation 
resistance, including how the availability of the materials, facilities, and expertise 
associated with a particular fuel cycle approach would affect the time, cost, 
uncertainty, and detectability of a nuclear weapons program 
 
The implementation of those elements that are feasible today, for example, assurance of fuel 
supply, should not be delayed while other options are being refined or explored both 
institutionally and technically. 
 
 
                                                 
7 One run internationally and including all elements of the fuel cycle. 
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Finding 12 
The United States and the Russian Federation have signed an agreement on peaceful nuclear 
cooperation, but it must still be allowed to come into force.  The lack of a U.S.-Russian 
agreement in force is interfering with joint efforts to reduce proliferation.  The expanded 
cooperation in nuclear energy research and development and commercial implementation that 
such a bilateral cooperation could make possible could serve both countries’ interests in 
expanding the use of nuclear energy while meeting safety, security, and nonproliferation 
objectives.  Article 2 of the signed agreement lists possible areas of cooperation, including, 
among other areas, scientific research and development on nuclear power reactors and their fuel 
cycles; nuclear fuel cycle services; radioactive waste handling; and nuclear safety, regulation, 
nonproliferation, and safeguards. 
 
The joint committees recognize that it is unlikely that the U.S. government will bring the 
agreement into force in an environment of worsening relations between the United States and 
Russia.  It is the joint committees’ hope that current disagreements that have recently emerged 
will not interfere with the United States and Russia working together toward their common goal 
of inhibiting nuclear weapons proliferation as nuclear energy use grows across the world. 
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PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 
 
The so-called nuclear renaissance has increased worldwide interest in nuclear power.  
This potential growth also has increased, in some quarters, concern that nonproliferation 
considerations are not being given sufficient attention.  In particular, since the introduction of 
many new power reactors will lead to requiring an increase in uranium enrichment services to 
provide the reactor fuel, the proliferation risk of adding enrichment facilities in countries that do 
not have them now led to proposals to provide the needed fuel without requiring new indigenous 
enrichment facilities.  Similar concerns exist for reprocessing facilities.   
In 2006, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Mohamed 
ElBaradei, Russian President Vladimir V. Putin, and U.S. President George W. Bush each 
announced plans to assure the provision of fuel to countries that want to develop nuclear power.  
The proposals were aimed at dissuading these countries from building uranium enrichment plants 
because such plants could be used to produce weapons-usable highly enriched uranium.  In the 
spring of 2006, members of the Committees on International Security and Arms Control of the 
U.S. National Academy of Sciences (NAS) and the Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS), which 
have had a productive partnership for more than 25 years, met with each other, with senior 
officials in their respective governments, and with Director General ElBaradei to identify issues 
of national and international importance on which independent advice from the two academies 
would be useful.  
With funding from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation and the Carnegie 
Corporation of New York, two committees with members appointed by the NAS and the RAS, 
working jointly, produced this report analyzing the proposals and options for future international 
nuclear fuel cycles, including the incentives that might be required for countries to accept fuel 
assurance guarantees and not develop enrichment or reprocessing facilities, as well as technical 
fuel-cycle issues.  The statement of task for this study can be found in Appendix A.  The task 
notes that this report is not intended to cover the policy and technical aspects of international fuel 
cycles comprehensively.  Rather, the joint committees summarize key issues and analyses, offer 
some criteria for evaluating options, and make findings and recommendations to help the United 
States, the Russian Federation, and the international community reduce proliferation and other 
risks as nuclear power is used more widely. 
This report is intended for all those who are concerned about the need for assuring fuel 
for new reactors and at the same time limiting the spread of nuclear weapons.  This audience 
includes the United States and Russia, other nations that currently supply nuclear material and 
technology, many other countries contemplating starting or growing nuclear power programs, 
and the international organizations that support the safe, secure functioning of the international 
nuclear fuel cycle, most prominently the International Atomic Energy Agency. 
Fuel assurance proposals have been discussed in conferences and journal articles.  
However, to receive input from the countries that might use the fuel assurance program, the joint 
committees held a workshop at the IAEA in April 2007, where people from eight countries 
presented their opinions or comments on the fuel assurance programs.  While not officially 
representing their governments, these experts provided valuable insights into the issues that must 
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be addressed for the fuel assurance programs to succeed.  Appendix B of the report contains a 
summary of the workshop.  The joint committees also addressed technologies being developed 
for new approaches to reprocessing (also called recycling and regeneration) and possible 
advanced reactors.  While these discussions are necessarily limited due to the technologies being 
in the early stages of development or existing only as concepts, some advantages and 
disadvantages are discussed. 
The joint committees addressed the different elements of the statement of task at different 
levels.  Much of Part B of the task calls for comparisons of technologies in Russia with those 
envisaged in the United States.  The Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) comprises two 
initiatives from President George W. Bush.  One is an international initiative beginning with an 
accord expressing the signatories’ guiding principles for expansion of nuclear power.  The other 
is a domestic nuclear energy and fuel cycle technology initiative with seven different goals.  The 
international initiative has garnered dozens of partners.  The domestic technology initiative has 
shifted its focus, emphasis, and timeline several times over the course of the study.  These 
changes were significant, from switches among advanced fuel processing technologies that are 
mostly in the research phase and evolutionary commercial fuel-processing technologies to 
different fuels manufactured with as-yet-to-be-developed technologies.  For these reasons, the 
joint committees were unable to compare the concrete Russian technological options with the 
multitude under consideration in GNEP.  Because the Russian approaches have been developed 
more fully and in many cases the Russian government has selected particular approaches for 
deployment, these approaches are described in more detail in this report than the early-stage 
concepts being considered in the U.S.  Technologies in related areas being pursued in other 
countries were beyond the joint committees’ charge, and are considered only in passing here. 
 We wish to thank the IAEA, especially Director General Mohamed ElBaradei, Deputy 
Director General Yuri Sokolov, and Tariq Rauf for their support of our international workshop 
held in Vienna.  We also thank Alan MacDonald of the IAEA for his substantial assistance in 
arranging the workshop.  We thank the workshop attendees and the presenters at the joint 
committee meetings in the United States and Russia who provided us with their expert 
knowledge (see Appendix E). 
 We especially thank Yuri Shiyan of the RAS, Micah Lowenthal, NAS Study Director, 
and Rita Guenther of the NAS.  Without the tireless work of these three individuals, the report 
would not have been completed. 
This joint study addresses some of the serious international issues connecting the spread 
of nuclear power and nonproliferation concerns.  The NAS and RAS have met and worked 
together for many decades on issues related to science and technology, including decades of 
dialogues and, more recently, joint studies on international security problems.  We strongly 
believe that inhibiting the spread of nuclear weapons capabilities while promoting better access 
to safe, clean energy is in the interests of Russia, the United States, and the larger world 
community.  It is precisely at times like these, then, that cooperation is needed between our 
scientific communities to help focus on those common interests and promote efforts toward 
common goals.  The need for such cooperation grows under the conditions we see today. 
 
John F. Ahearne      Nickolay P. Laverov 
Committee Co-Chair      Committee Co-Chair 
U.S. National Academies     Russian Academy of Sciences 
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